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Affirmative Action in the Marketplace 
of Ideas 
Rodney A. Smolla ... 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 1 a majority of the 
Supreme Court for the first time approved an affirmative ac-
tion program on the grounds that the program promoted "di-
versity" in the marketplace of ideas. 
A great deal turns on whether promoting intellectual di-
versity is a sufficient basis for justifying affirmative action pro-
grams. Prior to Metro Broadcasting, the Court had approved 
affirmative action plans only as remedies for past discrimina-
tion. If the diversity rationale becomes an accepted element of 
affirmative action jurisprudence, institutions involved in activ-
ities that implicate the marketplace of ideas, particularly uni-
versities, may have wider latitude to implement affirmative 
action programs, for they will be liberated from the necessity 
of linking their programs to evidence of prior discrimination. 
More poignantly, basing affirmative action plans on the 
notion of diversity is in many respects more attractive than 
basing such plans solely on remedying past discrimination; the 
diversity rationale tends to dissipate the stigma that some-
times attends remedial affirmative action. Remedial affirma-
tive action programs have always been vulnerable to the 
argument that those who benefit from such programs "could 
not make it on their own merits," the implication being that 
the institution implementing the affirmative action plan is do-
ing the applicant a favor, making up for past sins. 
When the diversity rationale is applied, however, theta-
bles of perception are somewhat turned. The applicant now 
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does the institution a favor, enriches the institution, brings to 
it the positive asset of new perspectives. The diversity ration-
ale thus frees affirmative action from its "necessary evil" label, 
instead placing upon it the upbeat rhythms of the first amend-
ment. Applicants escape the taint of being "beneficiaries." 
Affirmative action programs.designed to enrich institutions by 
enhancing diversity reverse the psychological equation of re-
medial plans. In remedial affirmative action plans, the institu-
tion's unstated message may be understood as: "You are 
deficient because you are the victim of the lingering effects of 
past discrimination, and therefore we are employing a remedy 
to make up for your deficiency." When the diversity rationale 
is used, however, the message shifts in emphasis: "Because this 
institution is deficient, in lacking sufficient diversity in its intel-
lectual marketplace, we invite you to join us to remedy the 
institutional deficiency." When diversity is the rationale, the 
institution needs the applicant more than the applicant needs 
the institution. 
While diversity is an appealing theory upon which to 
base affirmative action programs, it also presents a number of 
policy and legal difficulties. The notion of "diversity" in equal 
protection thinking, which may require intervention and regu-
lation of the market, is in tension with the notion of "diver-
sity" in classic free speech thinking, a legal arena that has 
always tended to treat government intervention in the market-
place as an anathema. 
This article explores the idea of diversity from the equal 
protection and free speech perspectives and examines the con-
stitutional and philosophical legitimacy of affirmative action 
in the marketplace of ideas. 
II. THE METRO BROADCASTING DECISION 
Two Federal Communication Commission (FCC) minor-
ity preference policies were at issue in Metro Broadcasting: the 
Commission's minority preference policies in comparative li-
censing proceedings and its minority preference policies for 
"distress sales." 
In its comparative licensing process, the Commission 
grants "plus points" for minority ownership when evaluating 
competing applicants for new licenses. The FCC uses numer-
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ous criteria when evaluating applicants for broadcasting 
licenses. Those criteria include the applicant's past broadcast 
record, character, and proposed program service, as well as 
the efficient use of the frequency. 2 ·In 1978 the Commission 
announced that minority ownership and participation in man-
agement would be considered as a "plus" factor, to be 
weighed with all other relevant factors, in comparative licen-
sure hearings. 3 The Metro Broadcasting Company competed 
with Rainbow Broadcasting Company for a license to con-
struct and operate a new UHF television station in Orlando, 
Florida. Rainbow was ultimately awarded the license over 
Metro because Rainbow was ninety percent Hispanic-owned. 4 
The Commission's minority distress sale progra~ per-
mits certain licensees in jeopardy of losing their licenses to sell 
their licenses to minority-controlled firms. Normally, when a 
licensee's qualifications to continue to hold a broadcast license 
are questioned, the licensee is forbidden to assign or transfer 
the license until the FCC conducts a hearing resolving the li-
censee's qualifications. The minority preference distress sale 
policy is an exception to that general rule, allowing a broad-
caster whose license or renewal application has been desig-
nated for a revocation hearing to assign the license to an FCC-
approved "minority enterprise" at a distress sale price.' The 
price of the distress sale must not exceed seventy-five percent 
of the fair market value. (Rather than endure a protracted 
hearing over its qualifications, the licensee may prefer to sell 
out to a minority enterprise, even though the lieensee receives 
less than it might otherwise have obtained from the sale.) The 
assignee must meet the FCC's basic qualifications. 6 
2. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 
(1965). 
3. See WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978). 
4. An FCC Review Board awarded Rainbow "substantial enhancement" because 
it was 90 percent Hispanic-owned. Rainbow's minority enhancement points out-
weighed Metro's local residence and civic participation points. Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 688 (Rev. Bd. 1984). 
5. See Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in 
Broadcasting, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 851 (1982). The minority o~ership must exceed 50 
percent or be controlling. 
6. Faith Center, Inc., operated a Hartford, Connecticut television station. Faith 
Center petitioned the FCC on three occasions for a distress sale. The first two attempts 
at the sale failed because the buyer could not obtain adequate financing. Between Faith 
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The United States Supreme Court upheld both FCC mi-
nority preference policies. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice 
William Brennan, the Court held that the FCC's policies 
should be judged by the "intermediate scrutiny" standard of 
equal protection review, rather than by "strict scrutiny."' 
The application of the more lax intermediate scrutiny test was 
surprising, because the Court had appeared to be settling on 
the strict scrutiny test as the appropriate standard of review 
for racial affirmative action. This trend, first signaled in Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education, 8 appeared to command a 
majority of the Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 9 
Wygant involved a preferential layoff system by a school 
board. The Jackson Board of Education (Board) responded to 
racial tension in its schools by approving a layoff provision in 
the collective bargaining agreement with its teachers that fa-
vored minority teachers. 10 When layoffs occurred in the aca-
demic years 1976-77 and 1981-82, the Board retained 
minority teachers but released non-minority teachers with 
Center's second and third petitions, Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. applied to 
the FCC for a permit to build a television station in Hartford. Shurberg's application 
was mutually exclusive with Faith Center's renewal application. When Faith Center 
petitioned the FCC a third time, requesting permission to sell the station to Astroline 
Communications Company, a minority enterprise, Shurberg challenged the proposed 
sale, alleging that the distress sale program violated its rights to equal protection. See 
Schuberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The 
Court of Appeals invalidated the FCC minority distress sale program. The court held 
that the policy deprived Shurberg of its equal protection rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment because the program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination, 
placed undue burdens on an innocent non-minority, and was not reasonably related to 
the interests it sought. 
7. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3008-09. The strict scrutiny test requires a 
"compelling" government interest that is "narrowly tailored" to achieve the interest. 
"Intermediate scrutiny" requires only "important" governmental interests that are 
"substantially related" to the achievement of those interests. For a concise explication 
of these standards, see generally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & N. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW§ 14.3, at 530-35 (3d ed. 1986). 
8. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
9. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). There was no five-Justice majority for 
all aspects of the Croson holding, which was announced in an opinion by Justice 
O'Connor. At least five Justices, however, endorsed "strict scrutiny or better" as the 
appropriate standard of review-with the "or better" encompassing the "absolute color-
blind" position that would hold all affirmative action programs unconstitutional per se. 
10. The layoff provision provided that teachers with the greatest seniority would 
be retained in the event of a layoff; however, at no time would the percentage of minori-
ties laid off exceed the percentage of minority personnel employed at that time. Wy-
gant, 416 U.S. at 270. 
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greater seniority. 11 The Board's decision was challenged and 
eventually invalidated by the Supreme Court. 12 Justice Pow-
ell, , announcing the judgment of the Court, found that strict 
scrutiny applied to any racial classification, and did not differ 
in application when the racial classification was against a 
group not historically subjected to discrimination. 13 
11. Prior to these layoffs, the Board had laid off numerous teachers in 1974, but 
retained tenured non-minority teachers over probationary minority teachers, therefore 
violating the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement. The Union, together 
with two minority teachers who were laid off, sued under state contract law, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. /d. at 271. The claims failed in federal district court and state court, but the 
layoff provision was upheld. 
12. Both the district court and the circuit court held that racial preferences "were 
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause as an attempt to remedy societal discrim-
ination by providing 'role models' for minority schoolchildren .... " /d. at 272-73. 
13. /d. at 273 (plurality opinion). Applying the first prong of strict scrutiny, Jus-
tice Powell held that the Court had never tolerated societal discrimination alone as a 
sufficient justification for racial classification. /d. at 274. The Court, he explained, has 
always required a showing of discrimination by the governmental unit involved. The 
role model theory advanced by the district court would create a snowball effect, he 
maintained, because it would allow the Board to engage in race-conscious hiring long 
past the time that the remedial effect of the program required. /d. at 275-76. 
Justice Powell determined that less intrusive means than the layoff provisions ex-
isted to achieve any constitutionally valid purposes advanced by the Board. /d. at 283-
84. Strict scrutiny requires that the means to accomplish a compelling interest must be 
narrowly tailored. Preferential layoff programs are particularly troublesome, Justice 
Powell asserted, because a small group of individuals bear the burden of the program. 
The non-minority teachers with greater seniority shoulder the entire load, Powell ar-
gued, whereas preferential hiring policies distribute the burden across the entire hiring 
pool. /d. at 282. "Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss 
of an existing job." /d. at 282-83. Justice Powell ultimately found that because hiring 
goals were a less intrusive means of accomplishing legitimate purposes, the layoff pro-
gram was not narrowly tailored to meet its ends. Justice O'Connor, otherwise joining 
with Justice Powell, rejected the layoff program because it had no legitimate ties to the 
purpose of remedying racial discrimination. /d. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). · 
Dissenting, Justice Marshall stated that the Court should not have attempted to 
resolve the constitutional questions because the record before it was incomplete. /d. at 
296 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, he phrased the issue on the merits as 
whether a union and a school board could develop a collective bargaining agreement 
that maintained a valid affirmative hiring policy by apportioning layoffs among minori-
ties and non-minorities. /d. at 300. 
Using the history of the provision, Justice Marshall determined that the purpose of 
the layoff provisions was to preserve the "integrity of a valid hiring policy-which in tum 
sought to achieve diversity and stability for the benefit of all students." /d. at 306. 
When viewed in this light, he argued, the layoff provision passed any standard of review 
or constitutional demands that the Court chose to apply. /d. at 303. 
Referring to history, Justice Marshall concluded that the provision provided the 
best means for rectifying the situation of past discrimination. As long as layoffs contin-
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Croson involved the City of Richmond's Minority Busi-
ness Utilization Plan. This plan required that prime contrac-
tors who were awarded city construction projects to 
subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of 
each contract to Minority Business Enterprises (MBE). 14 The 
Plan defined an MBE as a business from anywhere in the 
country that was. at least fifty-one percent owned or controlled 
by minority owners. 15 A prime contractor could apply for a 
waiver if it could not locate a qualified MBE after every feasi-
ble attempt to comply with the Plan. 16 The Plan was intended 
to remedy past discrimination in the construction industry. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, applied strict 
scrutiny to affirm the lower court finding that the City of 
Richmond lacked a compelling interest in remedying past dis-
crimination within an entire industry. 17 Justice O'Connor's 
opinion distinguished specific findings of past discrimination 
ued to remove the last hired, which would be the minority teachers employed under the 
hiring goals, integration of the faculty would not be achieved. /d. at 307. Marshall 
argued that Justice Powell's hiring alternative lacked logic because those minorities 
hired under the policy would be the first to lose their jobs in a layoff. /d. at 307-08. One 
other method of preserving minority percentages on the faculties would be a random 
lottery system; this however would jeopardize every teacher and disturb the seniority 
system even further. /d. at 310. 
Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that instead oflooking at the past, the Court 
should examine the Board's goals of future education for the students and consider 
whether that interest supported the program. /d. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He 
concluded that a school board may reasonably conclude that the student will receive a 
better education from a diverse faculty. /d. at 315. This argument, he maintained, 
would not empower a school board to determine that students would gain a better edu-
cation from segregated classrooms and faculty, because a logical line can be drawn be-
tween programs that include a member of a minority group and programs that exclude 
a member of a minority group. /d. at 316. Turning to the burden on non-minorities, 
Justice Stevens argued that the Union represented all the teachers, and therefore the 
non-minority teachers constructively agreed to the burden. /d. at 318. He further 
maintained that the layoffs resulted from economic and contractual circumstances, not 
racial classifications. /d. at 318-19. 
14. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477. 
15. Minority owners were defined as United States citizens who are Black, Span-
ish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleutian. /d. at 478. 
16. /d. 
17. /d. at 498-99 (plurality opinion). The case was brought by J.A. Croson, a 
prime contractor who was denied a waiver by Richmond. After the district court and 
the Fourth Circuit upheld the Richmond affirmative action program under the interme-
diate scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and re-
manded the case for further consideration after the its decision in Wygant. On remand, 
the Fourth Circuit struck down the Richmond plan for failing both prongs of the strict 
1991] DIVERSITY IN THE MARKETPLACE 941 
by the governmental entity employing an affirmative action 
plan from generalized concerns about past societal discrimina· 
tion, stating that "[a]n amorphous claim that there has been 
past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the 
use of an unyielding racial quota."18 O'Connor concluded 
that no evidence existed to support any claim of past discrimi· 
nation against minorities in Richmond's construction indus· 
try. 19 Justice O'Connor further held that the Richmond plan 
failed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test due to its 
failure to narrowly tailor the remedy to achieve the purposes 
of redressing past discrimination. 20 
scrutiny test. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's 
finding that the plan was unconstitutional. 
In Parts II and III-A of her opinion, Justice O'Connor analyzed the standard of 
review for state and local set-aside programs. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 
(1980), the Court upheld a federal government minority set-aside. ·The principal opin-
ion in Fullilove, written by Chief Justice Burger, did not apply strict scrutiny, on the 
theory that the Court was bound to grant appropriate deference to a co-equal branch of 
the federal government. Relying on Fullilove, the City of Richmond argued that it need 
not make a finding of specific discrimination to "engage in race-conscious relief." 
Croson, 488 U.S. at 489. Justice O'Connor's opinion rejected this view. Congress, she 
argued, has a specific duty to enforce the fourteenth amendment and may therefore 
identify and remedy societal discrimination. /d. at 490. The state and local govern-
ments, however, do not have the same mandate and thus may not base race-conscious 
measures on general societal discrimination. /d. at 490-91. Quite the contrary, section 
1 of the fourteenth amendment stemmed from a distrust of state governments' use of 
race classifications. /d. at 491. Justice O'Connor acknowledged that state and local 
governments do have an interest in eradicating past discrimination within its "own leg-
islative jurisdiction." /d. at 491-91. Race-conscious measures, according to Justice 
O'Connor, carry "a danger of stigmatic harm," and therefore should be reserved for 
remedial purposes. /d. at 493. Strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor argued, patrols the use 
of race-conscious measures by assuring that the state interest behind the measure is 
compelling and that the interest is narrowly tailored to achieve this interest. 
18. /d. at 499. 
19. ld. at 505-06. In O'Connor's view, the random inclusion of Aleuts and Es-
kimos demonstrated that Richmond did not develop the plan to remedy discrimination 
in its city's construction industry. 
20. ld. at 507-08. O'Connor claimed that the Court could not really ascertain 
whether the plan was connected to the purpose of remedying past discrimination, be-
cause no real proof of past discrimination was in the record. Jd. at 507. Further, 
O'Connor noted that Richmond did not attempt any race-neutral means before resort-
ing to a set-aside. ld. Richmond sintply employed a 30 percent set-aside without spe-
cific justification for that percentage, apparently assuming that the same proportion of 
minorities in a population will enter a particular trade. Jd. at 507-08. Richmond's only 
interest in the quota system appeared to be administrative convenience, "obvious[ly] ... 
not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination." Jd. at 507-08. 
The dissents, opinions by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, found the Court's in-
ability to find a history of discrimination in the former capital of the Confederacy ironic. 
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In Metro Broadcasting, Justice Brennan distinguished 
Croson on the grounds that "benign" racial classifications, 
promulgated at the direction of Congress, required greater 
deference by the Court. Brennan's opinion relied heavily on 
the Court's 1980 decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick 21 which 
sustained a congressional program setting aside federal con-
struction grants for minority business enterprises. 22 Against 
the backdrop of Fullilove, Justice Brennan in Metro Broad-
casting declared: 
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress -
even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of 
being designed to compensate victims of past governmen-
tal or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permis-
sible to the extent that they serve important governmental 
objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives. 23 
The Court in Metro Broadcasting thus distinguished the 
FCC's race-conscious policy from that in Croson on the the-
ory that the minority set-aside program in Croson involved a 
municipal government, not the federal government. Applying 
the more deferential intermediate scrutiny standard to the 
/d. at 528-29 (Marshall, J. dissenting); id. at 561-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If Rich-
mond could bring itself to admit to past discrimination, the dissenters argued, surely the 
Court should not second-guess its decision. According to Justice Marshall, the Court's 
attack on state and local affirmative action will chill attempts to "rectify the scourge of 
past discrimination." /d. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Justice Marshall also dissented from Justice O'Connor's application of strict scru-
tiny. He would have applied intermediate scrutiny, upholding race-conscious classifica-
tions that served an important governmental goal and were substantially related to the 
achievement of that goal. /d. at 535. Applying this lower standard of review, Justice 
Marshall found the Richmond Plan easily valid. /d. at 535-61. 
21. 448 u.s. 448 (1980). 
22. Fullilove involved the validity of the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) pro-
vision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-32, 91 Stat. 116 
(1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1988)). The MBE program set aside 10 
percent of federal funds granted for public works programs for United States citizens 
who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. The pro-
gram provided for an administrative waiver mechanism. Seven Justices in the case 
voted to uphold the plan. While the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger, joined by 
Justices White and Powell, did not articulate any specific standard of review, the lan-
guage of the opinion was extremely deferential to congressional power. Three other 
Justices, Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, upheld the program using the intermediate 
scrutiny standard. Justice Stevens upheld the plan, even though he applied a standard 
close to strict scrutiny. 
23. 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09. 
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FCC's minority enhancement policies, the Court had no diffi-
culty sustaining the preferences, finding that promotion of di-
versity in the broadcast spectrum was certainly an 
"important" governmental interest and that the FCC pro-
grams were "substantially related" to achieving that interest. 24 
Ill. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Subsidiary Questions 
The Court has long been vexed over the appropriate stan-
dard of review for affirmative action, and Metro Broadcasting 
unsettled an issue that many had thought settled. The stan-
dard of review debate in Metro Broadcasting was wrapped up 
in a basketful of subsidiary questions: 
(1) Should affirmative action implemented by the federal 
government be treated more deferentially by courts than af-
firmative action at the state and local level? The Court would 
have us believe that Congress is less threatening to equality 
than state legislatures. Our historical experience, the argu-
ment goes, is that official racism has been primarily practiced 
by state and local governments. The federal government has 
led the way toward racial equality, imposing equal protection 
of the laws on the states. This is the lesson of the Civil War, 
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, the 
post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and its progeny, the integration of Little Rock Central 
High School, the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 
1968, and so on. In our constitutional experience on race is-
sues, the federal government has acted primarily as emancipa-
tor rather than repressor. Congress is less likely than the 
states to become an instrument of invidious discrimination, 
and when Congress engages in race-conscious measures, it is 
more likely to be motivated by benign objectives. 
(2) Should special judicial deference to federal affirmative 
action apply to all exercises of federal power, or only those actu-
ally mandated by Congress? This question of constitutional 
policy is in tum complicated by a debate over the historical 
facts surrounding the FCC's program. Were the FCC minor-
ity enhancement policies purely the product of the agency's 
24. ld. at 3009-26. 
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own policy decisions, or were the policies actually mandated 
by Congress?25 The Court in Metro Broadcasting made it em-
phatically clear that Congress had mandated the preference 
plans. The actual historical record on this point, however, 
was somewhat more ambiguous than the Court made it out to 
be. Congress never actually instructed the FCC, in a statute, 
to implement its minority preference programs. On the other 
hand, in various appropriations statutes and other legislation 
enacted over the years, Congress far exceeded mere acquies-
cence to the Commission's policies. Congress appeared to 
voice its formal endorsement of these Commission's policies, 
25. See Devins, Metro Broadc8sting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 
TEx. L. REv. 125 (1990). Professor Neal Devins presents a forceful critique of the 
Court's methodology in Metro Broadcasting, concentrating on three critical features of 
the decision: the application of intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, the 
characterization of the FCC policies as federally mandated, and the use of a diversity 
rather than remedial justification for the race-conscious policies. Id. at 129. Professor 
Devins takes issue with all three features. 
First, Devins attacks the Court's characterization of the policies as congressionally 
mandated. Id. at 136-41. The source of the FCC's comparative hearing policy is 
rooted, he argues, in a court of appeals opinion, not a congressional mandate. See TV 9, 
Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Prior to this opinion, the FCC had deter-
mined that the Federal Communications Act was colorblind. The court disagreed and 
ordered the FCC to adopt policies to improve the diversity of content, by promoting 
diversity of ownership. /d. at 136. The distress sale policy grew out of a White House 
policy. I d. at 137. President Carter, in a speech, called for "full minority participation" 
in ownership of broadcasting stations and suggested that a distress sale policy was one 
avenue to this objective. Id. In taking issue with the Supreme Court's view that Con-
gress "mandated" the FCC policies, Devins argues that a failure to enact legislation 
limiting the FCC policies did not amount to a mandate for those policies, and that the 
appropriations riders are not equivalent to a legislative authorization. Id. at 140. 
Second, Devins faults the Court's approval of race-conscious measures that the 
FCC promulgated for reasons other than remedying past discrimination. Id. at 141-55. 
Using separation of functions and antidiscrimination jurisprudence, Devins contends 
that remedial objectives are the only justification for race classifications. ld. at 142-43. 
According to Devins, the diversity rationale adopted by the Court in Metro Broadcast-
ing breaches the fundamental principle of antidiscrimination-to treat the individual as 
an individual and not as a member of a group. Id. at 144 .. 
Third, Devins argues, the Court's application of intermediate scrutiny to a race-
conscious policy was "pure sophistry," because the Court ignored its long history of 
applying strict scrutiny to equal protection cases irrespective of the state or federal na-
ture of the legislating body. ld. 
Devins concludes that Metro Broadcasting may do more harm than good for af-
firmative action because the underlying analysis is vulnerable. Id. at 155-56. The opin-
ion invites the Court to distinguish between benign and pernicious classification, a move 
that Devins predicts will allow Congress to use race "as simply another bargaining chip 
in the legislative process." Id. at 155. 
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and attempted to block any effort by the agency to reconsider 
them. That the Court felt the need to massage this historical 
record into a finding that the FCC's programs were congres-
sionally mandated might be understood as a signal that the 
Court would have been less deferential to an affirmative action 
plan created by an agency on its own frolic and detour. 
(3) If the FCC policies should be treated as congressio-
nally mandated, were they mandated pursuant to Congress' 
"section 5 power" to enforce the fourteenth amendment, or 
were they mandated pursuant to Congress' more general legis-
lative powers, such as the commerce clause? The Court has 
held on a number of occasions that Congress has powers 
under section 5 of the fourteenth_ amendment that allow it to 
create rights and remedies that go beyond what the main body 
of the fourteenth amendment requires. Thus, it is argued, 
when Congress acts pQ.rsuant to its section 5 power, it may 
have greater authority, and be entitled to correspondingly 
greater deference by the Supreme Court, than when it is en-
gaged in the exercise of its more mundane legislative powers, 
such as the regulation of interstate commerce. 26 
B. The Artificiality of a Two-Tiered Standard 
What are we to make of these subsidiary questions? We 
should make the harsh judgment that the Court was utterly 
wrong to ever get into them. These questions are peripheral. 
Nothing should have turned on any of them. 
It is disappointing that the merits of the philosophical 
disputes posed by the use of diversity as a rationale for affirm-
ative action should be so muddled by. the standard of review 
debate and mired in this host of subsidiary factual and legal 
questions. For none of those subsidiary questions should have 
really mattered: the Court should apply the same standard of 
review to all affirmative action plans, whether enacted at the 
federal, state, or loc_al level, and whether formally mandated 
26. Linked to this argument is whether only "remedial" legislation may trace its 
constitutional source to section 5. This in turn implicates a debate over whether diver-
sity in the broadcast spectrum was really the principle rationale for the FCC program. 
Professor Devins, for example, argues that it was a primarily remedial measure mas-
querading under the cover story of achieving diversity. See Devins, supra note 25, at 
15-53. 
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by a legislative body or instead implemented by an adminis-
trative agency through traditional courses of the administra-
tive process. Affirmative action poses profound moral and 
constitutional conflicts. 27 The resolution of those conflicts 
should not change with the arcania of separation of powers 
jurisprudence or the trivia of administrative law. 
Affirmative action is too important an issue in contempo-
27. The academic literature in the area is rich. See, e.g., 1 CoNSULTATION OF THE 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION STATEMENT OF THE U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PA-
PERS PRESENTED (1981); B. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); R. 
DWORKIN, Reverse Discrimination, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223 (1977); N. 
GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1975); ]. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & ]. YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW at 661-82; RE-
VERSE DISCRIMINATION (B. Grossed. 1977); Balwin & Nagan, Board of Regents v. 
Bakke: The All-American Dilemma Revisited, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 843 (1978); Bell, 
Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 
3 (1979); Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race 
Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962); Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell 
Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 21 (1979); Boxhill, The Morality of Preferential 
Hiring, 7 PHIL. & PUB. APP. 246 (1978); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term For-
ward; In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1976); 
Choper, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action: Views From the Supreme Court, 70 
KY. L.J. 1 (1981-82); Dixon, Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 69 
(1979); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 
723 (1974); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School 
Admissions, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 559 (1975); Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of 
Reverse Discrimination, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (1979); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Hastie, Affirmative Action in 
Vindicating Civil Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L. REv. 502; Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Une-
qual World; Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 N.W. U.L. 
REv. 363 (1966); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1977); Karst & Horowitz, 
Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); Morris, Equal 
Protection, Affirmative Action, and Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 
CALIF. L. REv. 143 (1979); O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The 
Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974); Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of 
"Affirmative Action", 67 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1979); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the 
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1; 
Ravenell, DeFunis & Bakke ... The Voice Not Heard, 21 How. L.J. 128 (1978); Redish, 
Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the 
Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1974); Sandalow, Racial Preference in 
Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 
(1975); Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality, and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents ofthe 
University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329 (1977); Seeburger, A Heuristic 
Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 285 (1977); Tribe, Per-
spectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 864 (1979); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, 
and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979). 
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rary American life to be relegated to the artificial distinctions 
of the legal technocrat. Is anyone's moral judgment about af-
firmative action really influenced one way or another by 
whether it is implemented by a federal agency rather than a 
state agency? Or by whether Congress actually instructed the 
FCC in clear legislation to undertake its programs, merely en-
dorsed the Commission's plans after-the-fact, or simply in-
structed the Commission not to alter them? Does anyone, in 
taking stock of their constitutional and moral intuitions about 
affirmative action, draw distinctions between a federal policy 
enacted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 
and one enacted under the commerce clause? 
There should be a single standard of review for all affirm-
ative action plans implemented in the United States by gov-
ernment. It is true that throughout much of our history the 
principle of equal protection was enforced by the federal gov-
ernment against stubborn repositories of racism at the local 
and state level. And it may well be that in applying the stan-
dard, and putting the government to its proofs, courts will be 
influenced by the historical record on race issues of the partic-
ular governmental body that is attempting to defend its affirm-
ative action plan. If there is doubt whether a plan is truly 
"benign" toward minority groups, for example, or has instead 
been created to advance some invidious hidden agenda, then 
the past actions of the institution might be admissible as evi-
dence that all is not what it appears to be. But to treat federal 
affirmative action plans as enjoying blanket immunity from 
the level of judicial scrutiny to which such plans would other-
wise be subject, on the cavalier assumption that the federal 
government is less dangerous as a potential discriminator, 
simply cannot be justified under our constitutional traditions 
and experience. · 
In measuring that experience, it is worth reflecting on the 
Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Korematsu v. United 
States, 28 a case that is usually regarded as among the Court's 
first applications of the now familiar strict scrutiny test. Kore-
matsu arose from one of the most brazen and shameful viola-
tions of human dignity and equality in our modem experience: 
28. 323 u.s. 214 (1944). 
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the federal government's internment of American citizens of 
Japanese descent during World War II. Americans of Japa-
nese descent were interred in the camps, but not Americans of 
German or Italian descent-though we were also at war with 
Germany and Italy. The internment episode was infected 
throughout with racial stereotypes about the sly and insidious 
Japanese--a racism fueled by the hysteria of war, as racial and 
ethnic stereotypes so often are. 
Korematsu yields two relevant lessons. First, we see that 
the federal government may not boast of an inviolate record 
on matters of equality. Here was an episode of federal viola-
tion of basic norms of equal protection. It should give us no 
comfort that the violation occurred during the inevitable para-
noia of war, for war is uniquely the business of the federal 
government, not the states, and in our constitutional tradition 
the federal government, not the states, has been the primary 
villain in the never-ending temptation of governments to sus-
pend civil rights and civil liberties for reasons of national se-
curity. Korematsu thus lends a hollow ring to the Metro 
Broadcasting decision's claim that we need not fear the feds. 
The second lesson of Korematsu derives from the fact 
that the Court in that case did, after all, purport to apply 
strict scrutiny. Even strict scrutiny, however, proved impo-
tent constitutional medicine, for the state upheld the intern-
ment. We should thus be circumspect about the importance 
of these elegant multi-part constitutional tests. It's not the la-
bels or the language that give them genuine life, but their ap-
plication in action. 
With the sole possible exception of the Fullilove case that 
preceded it, Metro Broadcasting stands alone it its assertion 
that constitutional guarantees apply less rigorously to the fed-
eral government. In all Bill of Rights matters, indeed, the tra-
dition has been quite the opposite. The Supreme Court has 
either applied the same standard to both state and federal ac-
tion29-the most common course--or it has applied a less rig-
orous standard to the states. 30 
Now it might be objected that equal protection is differ-
29. The speech and religion clauses, for example, apply in the same manner to 
federal and state activity. · 
30. The seventh amendment's right to jury trial in civil cases exceeding twenty 
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ent, because the fourteenth amendment in language and his-
tory is targeted against the states, and section 5 of the 
fourteenth amendment explicitly grants Congress enforcement 
powers. But this argument is shot with holes. First, it proves 
too much, because if we are to be that literal in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence, we would ha~ to own up to the fact that 
there is no Equal Protection Clause literally binding the fed-
eral government at all. The only Equal Protection Clause is in 
the fourteenth amendment. When the Supreme Court struck 
down the. system of segregated schools in Washington, D.C., a 
federal enclave, it made up for this constitutional embarrass-
ment by reading an "equal protection component" into the 
fifth amendment's due process clause. In that decision, Boll-
ing v. Sharpe, 31 a companion case to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 32 the Supreme . Court opined that "it would be 
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
duty on the Federal Govemment."33 
The section 5 argument, however, has even more 
debilitating flaws. At best, section 5 would authorize greater 
deference to efforts by Congress to enforce equal protection 
values against the s,tates. To the extent that the fourteenth 
amendment is properly understood as effectuating a "dra-
matic change in the balance between congressional and state 
power over matters of race,"34 that change can only refer to 
the power of Congress to get tough with the states in securing 
the equal protection of the laws against state invasion. 35 
When Congress or a federal agency indulges in race-based 
classifications as part of the administration of federal pro-
grams, however, section 5 is irrelevant. 
Finally, it is worth examining the standard of review 
analysis in Metro Broadcasting from the wide-angle lens. The 
Court's repeated caveat that its decision applies only to "be-
nign" racial classifications is ineffective and conclusory. Con-
dollars has been applied only to the federal government-the states are exempt from 
that amendment entirely. 
31. 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
32. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
33. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
34. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (O'Connor, J.). 
35. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879). 
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sider the curious asymmetry of equal protection law after 
Metro Broadcasting. Strict scrutiny applies to invidious state 
racial discrimination, and also to benign state affirmative ac-
tion plans. Strict scrutiny similarly applies to invidious fed-
eral discrimination. Only benign federal discrimination gets 
the special treatment. 36 
The Court's only defense of this asymmetry is its argu-
ment that somehow we should trust Congress' assurances that 
its motives are benign when it acts pursuant to section 5. We 
will know real discrimination when we see it, the argument 
goes, and will apply strict scrutiny when we do. But if the 
Court is confident that it can separate benign from invidious 
forms of discrimination, that at best supports treating all af-
firmative action plans, state and federal, more deferentially 
than invidious discrimination. 
There is indeed a circular, question-begging quality to the 
whole analytic structure of the Court's standard of review ar-
gument in Metro Broadcasting. For even if Congress' section 
5 power could be invoked legitimately, the critical question 
would merely be posed and left unanswered. In its interpreta-
tion of section 5, the Court clearly professed that Congress 
may only use its enforcement powers to extend rights guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment, not to retract them. 37 
This is the "rachet effect" of the fourteenth amendment: Con-
gress may create causes of action or remedies that enhance the 
protection of the amendment, but it may never use its section 
5 powers to roll back the substantive protection of the amend-
ment. Congress may not use section 5, for example, to au-
thorize sex discrimination that would otherwise be 
unconstitutional. Nor, back in the days in which Roe v. 
Wade 38 was still incontestably good law,39 could Congress 
have used its section 5 powers to overrule Roe by declaring 
that life begins at conception, and that pursuant to section 5, 
it was extending the reach of the fourteenth amendment to 
36. And, as far as one can tell from the Court's analysis, the question of what is or 
is not benign is judged only from the perspective of the minority group members who 
benefit from affirmative action plans, not from the majority group members who are 
displaced. 
37. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
38. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
39. See Webster v. Center for Reproductive Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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treat the fetus as a person. Although such a congressional en-
actment would have extended the rights of the fetus, it would 
have worked a corresponding retraction of the rights of the 
mother. Whether section 5 was being used to extend constitu-
tional rights or recoil them would thus tum on who you 
asked. 
Affirmative action works similarly. It, like abortion, is a 
zero-sum game. Real affirmative action programs work when 
they hurt; the racial preference granted to members of some 
groups necessarily creates racial disadvantages to members of 
other groups--the notion of a preference is meaningless unless 
someone is preferred. 
IV. OF REMEDIES AND DIVERSITY, EUPHEMISM 
AND CANDOR 
Perhaps the Court's argument that congressionally-man-
dated affirmative action should be judged by a different stan-
dard than state-mandated affirmative action cannot withstand 
analysis. But that does not by itself demonstrate that the 
Court was wrong in Metro Broadcasting. To the extent that 
Metro Broadcasting appears inconsistent with decisions apply-
ing strict scrutiny to affirmative action (such as the Court's 
decision the term before in Croson), we could just as plausibly 
decide that Metro Broadcasting got the standard right, and 
that Croson got it ·vrong. Alternatively, we might decide that 
the decision in Metro Broadcasting was correct even if the 
analysis was defective; we could, for example, reach the con-
clusion that the FCC's racial preference programs were con-
stitutional even under the strict scrutiny test. 
Despite everything I have said up to now about Metro 
Broadcasting, in my view the case was rightly decided on its 
merits. The FCC's use of racial preferences was correctly 
judged constitutional. As might be suspected, however, my 
reasons for reaching this conclusion are somewhat different 
from those rationales propounded by the Court. 
At the outset, it is useful to take stock of the two princi-
pal competing notions of equality in the American experi-
ence. 40 "Process" or "individualist" equality is a competitive, 
40. See generally, J. CASPER, THE POLITICS OP CIVIL LIBERTIES 148-49 (1972). 
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individualist, Darwinian, survival-of-the-fittest, equal-oppor-
tunity version of equality that solely emphasizes the integrity 
and fairness of the rules of the game. "Outcome equality," on 
the other hand, which might also go by the name "collectivist 
equality,"41 is a cooperative, communal, from-each-according-
to-his-ability-to-each-according-to-his-need, representational 
version of equality that measures the degree of diversity and 
shared power that results from the game. 42 
Process equality thinking and outcome equality thinking 
are both well-established in American culture, and the two 
versions of equality constantly vie in legislatures, courts, and 
on university campuses. There are individualist extremists 
and collectivist extremists at either end of the spectrum who 
lack the intellectual imaginaiion to even see the world from 
the other side. Some individualist-equality thinkers, for exam-
ple, cannot imagine how any principled person could possibly 
prefer a results-oriented legal regime to a rule-oriented regime. 
To countenance disequality in the rules for the purpose of 
achieving greater equality in results is seen by these individu-
alists as a surrender of basic norms of justice-indeed, as an 
affront to the central notion of a rule of law. In the eyes of the 
ardent individualist, ardent exponents of affirmative action are 
over-zealous, under-principled, and perhaps even racist. 
Many zealous collectivists feel the same way, in reverse. 
Institutions should be dissatisfied with merely changing the 
formal rules of the game from racially biased to racially neu-
tral. For as long as gross imbalances in outcomes remain, 
such a change merely substitutes one form of apartheid for 
another. A just society is a society of shared power, of institu-
tions integrated in fact and not just in law. For many of these 
collectivist radicals, the ardent opponents of affirmative action 
are over-principled, under-just, and perhaps even racist.43 
Neither of these two views capture the American main-
For a recent popular example of the individualist perspective, as applied to contempo-
rary university life in the United States, see D. D'SOUSA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE 
POLITlCS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991). 
41. See Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 107 (1990). 
42. See Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing. Quotas, and Goals in 
the 1980s, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947, 960-62 (1985). 
43. See generally, Smolla, Integration Maintenance: The Unconstitutionality of Be-
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stream experience. Rather, the last several decades have wit-
nessed a blend of individualist and collectivist approaches to 
equality in most acts of Congress, decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, and in the affirmative action programs 
of most public and private institutions in American life. Both 
the individualist trait and the collectivist trait are alive and 
well in American thinking about race and ethnicity. The indi-
vidualist trait is, overall, the dominant gene, but it would be 
wrong to deny·either the influence or legitimacy of collectivist 
thinking. 
While there were, for example, a few members of Presi-
dent Reagan's Justice Department who believed that all race-
based governmental actions were unconstitutional unless they 
were "victim-specific" remedies fashioned to recompense the 
direct victims of proven discrimination, the more moderate 
voices in the administration, such as that of Solicitor General 
Charles Fried, prevailed.44 Fried is generally hostile to affirm-
ative action, but would permit the use of race remedies for 
proven past discrimination, even when the remedies are not 
victim-specific. 45 
The Reagan administration's view rejecting all affirma-
tive action was still, of course, overwhelmingly individualist.46 
nign Programs that Discourage Black Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J. 
891. (date) 
44. For an interesting "insider's" account of these battles over affirmative action 
within the Reagan Justice Department, see C. FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 89-131 (1991). 
45. /d. at 105-06. 
46. See Fried, supra note 41, at 107. Professor Fried discusses two concepts of 
equality: individualistic and collectivist. The former concept is based on the emphasis 
of the individual in the constitutional scheme which resists the tendency to separate the 
polity into racial groupings. /d. at 108-09. In contrast, the collectivist, group-rights 
conception regards discrimination as a group tragedy and treats individuals as members 
of groups and the group as the holder of independent rights. /d. at 109. Fried states 
that until Metro Broadcasting, the Court had adhered to the individualistic approach, 
recognizing that the rights created by the fourteenth amendment are "guaranteed to the 
individual." /d. at 107. 
Fried notes that the conflict between the two approaches is reflected in the conflict 
between the standards of review for race-conscious government action. /d. at 110. The 
individualist prefers strict scrutiny because he or she believes that all individuals should 
be treated equally regardless of race and therefore the government needs a compelling 
reason to draw racial lines. On the other hand, the collectivist, group-rights theorist 
does not require as strict of a scrutiny for legislation that attempts to secure equality for 
a group. /d. Fried states that the strict scrutiny test is appropriate when the govern-
ment attempts to attack broad social problems .by referring to race. /d. at 111. Before 
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The "Reagan view" would permit the use of race as a remedy 
only when the transferee is the actual victim of prior discrimi-
nation and the transferor is the prior discriminator. This sim-
ply allows race to be used to put the players in the same 
position that they would have been in were the rules of the 
game not racially skewed. 
The Reagan position, however, did not prevail in the 
Supreme Court. A majority of the Court in Croson was un-
willing to accept the view that affirmative action was per se 
unconstitutional, and that racial classifications should be lim-
ited to direct remedies for victims of prior discrimination. 
While much is made of the split between the strict scrutiny 
test employed by the conservative center of the Court and the 
intermediate scrutiny test endorsed by the liberal wing, those 
two factions share a willingness to endorse some affirmative 
action. They merely divide over how much. Those Justices 
who accept the intermediate scrutiny test and those who ac-
cept strict scrutiny are all willing to accept some degree of 
collectivist thinking. Once the colorblind position is rejected, 
and some affirmative action plans are going to be upheld, the 
debate is no longer over whether to permit the infiltration of 
collectivist thinking, but rather over how much infiltration is 
tolerable. 
Perhaps uncomfortable with this concession to collectiv-
ist thinking, strict scrutinizers on the Court (typified in an ear-
lier epoch by Justice Lewis Powell and now by Justice 
O'Connor), constantly and forcefully reiterate that equal pro-
tection principles must be based on individual rights rather 
than group rights. Thus Justice Powell admonished, "[t)he 
Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be dis-
tributed like bloc grants .... "47 And in a dissenting opinion in 
Metro Broadcasting drafted in apocalyptic tones, Justice 
O'Connor claimed that "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that 
the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not as sim-
ply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national 
Metro Broadcasting, Fried argues, the Court adhered to strict scrutiny and the individu-
alistic approach. 
47. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281 n.8 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion) (Powell, J.). 
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class.' "48 They doth protest too much. 
No meaningful affirmative action program can be justi-
fied purely in individualist terms. Under the strict scrutiny 
position espoused by Justice O'Connor, for example, an af-
firmative action plan at either the state or federal level could 
pass muster if the institution that implemented the plan is 
clearly guilty of past discrimination, and the plan is narrowly 
tailored to remedy the effects of that discrimination. Even 
this relatively cautious formulation, however, allows transfers 
of benefits to persons who may not have directly suffered the 
institution's past discrimination. Further, it allows the cost of 
the transfer to be absorbed by non-minorities, such as white 
males, who were probably not themselves guilty of acts of dis-
crimination and who may well not have personally benefitted 
from the institution's past discrimination. The individualist 
unity of causer and victim, transferor and transferee, has been 
abandoned. 
How different, really, are the strict scrutinizers from the 
intermediate scrutinizers? The differences are largely over-
blown. They can be distilled to the following distinctions: 
A. Institutional v. Societal Discrimination 
Strict scrutinizers insist on evidence that the institution 
implementing an affirmative action plan actually engaged in 
past discrimination against the groups to now benefit under 
the plan. The intermediate scrutinizers do not impose this 
proof requirement. They instead are willing to permit affirma-
tive action plans predicated on general societal discrimination 
against the groups now being benefitted. 
The intermediate scrutinizers have the better of this argu-
ment. The results of inquiries into an institution's history 
twenty, forty, sixty, or one hundred years past should not dic-
tate the resolution of modern affirmative action conflicts. 
First, the results of these inquiries are random and arbitrary. 
They turn on quirks of record-keeping, the persuasiveness of 
expert witnesses, and the craftsmanship of the drafter of the 
affirmative action plan. Read the Croson decision, hire a good 
48. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S.Ct. at 3028 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 10~3. 1083 (1983)). 
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lawyer and a good affirmative action consultant, be politic in 
what you say in the minutes of your official meetings, and 
your institution can compile a record of past discrimination 
that should be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Second, these historical demonstrations of institutional 
guilt are at best morally irrelevant and at worst destructive. 
While it may pay homage to individualist notions of equality 
to be able to point to an institution's prior bad record as justi-
fication for ~ffirmative action, most institutions today house 
only the ghosts of racists past. The present day officer-holders 
are not the ones who engaged in discrimination; indeed, they 
are the very people voting for affirmative action. There is in-
stitutional culpability, therefore, only in the wooden corporate 
law sense. The institution is guilty, but there is no live racial 
animus to animate that guilt. It may be comforting to insist 
that the affirmative action plan is designed to remedy those 
past evil deeds, but we are really dealing largely in euphe-
mism. Remember, strict scrutiny does not require proof that 
those who will benefit under a new affirmative action plan 
were actually discriminated against. Nor does it require that 
those displaced actually benefitted. · 
The line distinguishing this versio~ of institutional dis-
crimination from general societal discrimination is too thin to 
bear weight. Do we really believe that if two law schools in 
adjoining states implement the same affirmative action plan, in 
one case on the basis of documented proof of discrimination 
decades before, and in the other without such proof, one plan 
should be constitutional, and the other not? It is more honest 
to either approve or reject both programs. When a state law 
school faculty in 1991 votes to approve a new affirmative ac-
tion plan, basing its decision on a committee's investigation 
that uncovers discrimination in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, the 
formal purity of the individualist view of equality may be pre-
served. But, since no one on that faculty was guilty of those 
acts, and since all institutionalized discrimination was re-
nounced years before, the moral distinction between providing 
a remedy for this institutional discrimination and for general 
societal discrimination is meaningless. 
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B. Quotas v. Goals 
Denouncing the "quota society" has been effective polit-
ical rhetoric for the Reagan-Bush Republican Party, and a 
nightmare for liberal Democrats. The epithet "quota" is a 
one-word sound-bite-and a Q word to boot-dripping with 
negative connotation. The high authoritative scripture on this 
distinction derives from Justice Lewis Powell's opinion in Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke. 49 Powell was a 
masterful Justice, and his opinion in Bakke one of his master-
pieces-but that doesn't mean he got it right. Powell labored 
to distinguish the set-aside system used by the University of 
California-Davis M_edical School, in which a special number 
of places were reserved for minority applicants, from the 
Harvard admissions program, in which race counts as a "plus 
factor" along with innumerable other factors tending to pro-
mote diversity in the university community in which admis-
sion determinations are made on an individual case-by-case 
basis. so The University of California set aside seats, Harvard 
did not. The University of California engaged in collectivist 
equality thinking, Harvard did not. The University of Cali-
49. 438 u.s. 265, 265 (1978). 
SO. The special admissions program at issue in Bakke purported to advance four 
purposes, the fourth of which was "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an 
ethnically diverse student body." Id. at 438 U.S. 306. Justice Powell maintained that a 
university may constitutionally promote a diverse student body because the Court has 
long recognized the first amendment concept of "academic freedom." Id. at 312. As 
stated by Justice Frankfurter, academic freedom consists of four main freedoms of a 
university: (1) who may teach, (2) who may be taught, (3) what may be taught, and 
(4) how it will be taught. See Swezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), 
the Court again emphasized the importance of "safeguarding academic freedom" be-
cause the Nation's future compelled education "through a wide exposure to that robust 
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues ... .' " /d. at 
603. 
Justice Powell acknowledged that universities had long believed that a diverse stu-
dent body promoted a "robust exchange of ideas.'' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citations 
omitted). The President of Princeton University stated that a diverse student body 
encourages 
"interaction among students of both sexes; of ditferent races, religions, and 
backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states and 
countries; ... and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their 
differences and to stimulate one another .... 'People do not learn very much 
when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves.' " 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13, n.48 (quoting Bowen, AdmiSsions and the Relevance of Race, 
PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977). 
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fornia used quotas, Harvard did not. And Harvard ran away 
with the spoon. 
In cosmetic appearance, Harvard's plan was more palat-
able to American sensibilities. But appearances are deceiving. 
For at the margin, between two otherwise indistinguishable 
candidates competing for a scarce and finite number of admis-
sion seats, one candidate's race may be the plus that the other 
candidate cannot trump. And if this happens in a rolling ad-
missions program where the admissions committee keeps a 
watchful weather eye on the overall diversity picture, the ac-
tual demographic pattern of the entering class at a university 
using the Harvard approach and a university using a straight 
set-aside method may be identical. After Bakke, many insti-
tutions following astute legal advice redesigned their affirma-
tive action plans to resemble Harvard's. Indeed, in many 
respects the FCC's "plus factor" program for comparative li-
censing seemed to track Powell's Bakke opinion. 
Appearances, of course, often are important; they make 
symbolic statements about our values. There is, undeniably, 
something more appealing about Harvard's plan. Euphemism 
is not always evil, and candor is not always good. 51 The 
Harvard plan seemed more humane, and in that sense was 
more humane. 
But while the Harvard brand of "plus-factor" affirmative 
action may avoid the terrible Q's, the cold reality is that it still 
partakes of a heavy dose of collectivist thinking. 
C. Remedial v. Diversity Objectives 
Is diversity ever a legitimate basis for implementing af-
firmative action? How shall our knees jerk? Is the diversity 
rationale grounded in collectivist or individualist notions of 
equality? 
Since diversity in the marketplace purports to be a first 
amendment value, the search for legitimacy may begin there. 
In first amendment terms, however, the use of diversity as the 
basis for affirmative action has its difficulties. For while clas-
51. Indeed, in our everyday social life the person who is too blunt, who makes no 
effort to soften the message with an occasional caveat or rounded qualifier, is often 
dismissed as crude, rude, undiplomatic, or lacking in judgment. 
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sic first amendment theory always pledged allegiance to the 
value of diversity, this diversity was to arise spontaneously, of 
its own devices, from an unregulated market. In the general 
marketplace of ideas, government is not permitted to force 
private speakers to carry the messages of others, or to sup-
press one viewpoint to give greater representation to an-
other. 52 The whole concept of an "underrepresented 
viewpoint" is, indeed, nonsensical in the classic first amend-
ment marketplace. 
When the government has some special fulcrum over 
speech that extracts it from the general marketplace, however, 
one must check local listings-special first amendment rules 
may apply. When government itself is speaking, or when it 
employs, owns, or operates speech, speakers, or forums, for 
example, the first amendment may permit regulation that 
would be barred in the open marketplace. 53 
Take, for example, the hiring decisions of a university 
faculty. Could a college of arts and sciences at a major uni-
versity establish, as a deliberate policy, the maintenance of a 
mix of various professional perspectives-not just a mix of 
fields, but viewpoints: conservatives and liberals, communitari-
ans and libertarians, believers in a universe that is expanding, 
believers in a universe that is contracting, and believers in a 
universe going nowhere at all, capitalists, socialists, and free-
market economist"!, zionists and palestinians, existentialists, 
feminist historians, marxists, deconstructionists, critical theo-
rists, and defenders of traditional literary values (everyone by-
God, but the fiat-earth society-we've got to have some stan-
dards)-and in implementing such a policy, then use view-
point as a "plus factor" for "underrepresented" viewpoints to 
fill faculty openings? Today such a policy would probably not 
be viewed as violating the first amendment. Quite the con-
trary, such a policy would be considered an essential element 
of the university's institutional "academic freedom." If an 
opening comes up in the economics department, and it is 
agreed that department has a wealth of radical marxist theo-
rists but is relatively weak on conservative disciples of Milton 
5~. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
53. SeeR. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (forthcoming, 1992). 
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Friedman, then most would assume that the university should 
be permitted to go for a Friedmanite. 
We cannot automatically transfer this principle to other 
settings in which government has some leverage over speech. 
But regulating governmental forums or doling out govern-
mental benefits in a manner calculated to increase diversity is, 
as a threshold matter, permissible under the first amendment. 
In dispensing grants under the National Endowment for the 
Arts, the endowment may seek a diversified diet of artistic 
schools, genres, and art forms. In purchasing books for the 
public library, the librarian may seek a diversified collection. 
And in allocating licenses on the broadcast spectrum, a spec-
trum that is not the unregulated market of print media, but 
rather the highly regulated electronic spectrum comman-
deered years ago by the federal government, it is permissible 
to follow a deliberate policy of awarding plus points to new 
voices that will bring fresh perspectives to the spectrum. 
Radio and television broadcasters, in contrast to print 
media, have been subjected to substantial regulation of the 
content of their speech from the beginning. s4 The first amend-
ment has been interpreted to permit the federal government to 
impose standards of decency and even-handedness on broad-
casters, who are conceptualized as public trustees for the air-
waves.ss At various times in its history, the Federal 
Communications Commission has adopted rules limiting the 
number of broadcast stations that a person may own nation-
wide, s6 limiting the number of stations that may be owned in a 
single community,s7 and prohibiting newspaper publishers 
from owning television stations in the same communities in 
which they publish. ss The FCC promulgated the "Equal 
Time Doctrine"s9 requiring broadcasters to provide equal 
54. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 
190 (1943) .. 
55. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
56. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding the 
FCC regulation that no person or group could control more than 7 AM, 7 FM, and 7 
TV stations, raised in 1984 to 12, 12, and 12). 
57. In re Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 22 F.C.C.2d 206 (1970). 
58. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
59. Kennedy For Pres. Comm. v. FCC (Kennedy I), 636 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
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time for political candidates to present their positions, the 
"Fairness Doctrine" requiring that broadcasters "provide a 
reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting 
viewpoints,"60 "reasonable access" rules requiring stations to 
provide access to federal political candidates, 61 and "inde-
cency" regulations prohibiting broadcasters from airing "in-
decent" speech at certain times during the day.62 
These forms of content regulation have gone in and out 
of vogue at the FCC with shifts in regulatory winds. 63 But 
from a first amendment perspective, the pattern has been rela-
tively consistent. Generally, courts have upheld content-
based regulation of speech for broadcast media on the theory 
that the special characteristics of the media warrant special 
first amendment treatment. 
It is one thing to say that the first amendment permits 
policies designed to generate diversity of viewpoints. It is 
quite another thing to say, however, that it is permissible to 
gear such policies to identity. Should the Constitution permit 
identity to be used as a surrogate for viewpoint? It is a com-
plex and subtle problem. 
Diversity will be dismissed by many as a deceptive and 
promiscuous wink at individualist values in which the real 
agenda is purely collectivist, promoting proportional represen· 
tation of various racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual groups in 
all American institutions, for proportionality's own sake. The 
individualist thinker may well question whether diversity in 
the broadcast spectrum or on a university faculty is ever a 
valid justification for affirmative action. Because affirmative 
action programs entail an encroachment on the usual rule for-
60. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Syracuse Peace 
Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 717 (1990). 
61. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
62. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding time and place 
restrictions on indecent speech). The definition of "indecent" speech is much broader 
than the definition of "obscene" speech. Indecent speech includes vulgar or tasteless 
speech that does not qualify as obscene under the relatively strict first amendment defi-
nition of obscenity. The FCC rules, therefore, bar broadcasters from disseminating "in-
decent but not obscene" speech that print publishers could disseminate without 
restriction. 
63. See generally, L. PoyvE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1987); M. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CON-
TROLLING THE CoNTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA (1986). 
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bidding the use of race as a basis for dispensing government 
penalties and payments, the individualist may refuse to accept 
any affirmative action program not designed to advance equal-
ity goals. To justify equality sacrifices, there must be corre-
sponding equality gains, keeping the equality ledger in 
constant balance. The exacting individualist will thus blanche 
at the invocation of the diversity rationale for affirmative ac-
tion, because it uses a first amendment gain to justify a four-
teenth amendment loss. This is to use the individual as a 
means rather than an end, to force an individual to suffer a 
constitutional slight for the perceived greater good of that im-
personal abstraction, the marketplace of ideas. 
This failing is compounded in the eyes of many individu-
alist thinkers by the belief that the diversity rationale partakes 
of a glib and superficial racism all its own: the assumption that 
racial, ethnic, or sexual identity determines how people will 
live, feel, or think, and that there is anything so palpably dis-
cemable as a black viewpoint, Arab viewpoint, gay viewpoint, 
Jewish viewpoint, or Hispanic viewpoint. 
The diversity rationale, however, need not be so abstract, 
stereotyped, or dehumanizing. 64 There is an individualist 
strain in the desire for diversity, a sort of pluralistic collage 
Walt Whitman Song of Myself celebration of vibrant and 
unique individuals combining to make a lively and energetic 
marketplace. The aggregate effect of an increase in diversity 
among actor's identities in an intellectual marketplace will be 
an increase in the diversity of their criss-crossing messages, 
and in the vigor with which those messages collide, combine, 
or combust. Not just the ingredients, but the chemistry and 
volatility of the market will change. 
It would be stereotyping to assume that the racial, ethnic, 
religious, or sexual identity of any specific individual tells us 
what that person will believe. Views on abortion, school 
prayer, affirmative action, the Persian Gulf War, the savings 
and loan crisis, gay rights, sex discrimination, the right to bear 
arms, or the capital gains tax bear no necessary connection to 
identity. But when viewed as a marketplace views it, as a vast 
64. See Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular 
Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990). 
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collection of putters and callers bidding away in a cacophony 
of voices, a diverse and pluralistic market will behave differ-
ently than an homogenized market. 
Will a state university class on constitutional law, con-
taining 70 white male middle-class anglo-saxon protestant stu-
dents, discuss issues such as war, peace, abortion, prayer, 
busing, affirmative action, or tax rates with the same texture, 
chemistry, intensity, insight, combativeness, with the same 
richness, as a class of 70 students male and female, gay and 
straight, black, white, Hispanic, and Native American, rich 
and poor? Would a class consisting entirely of any one of 
those groups alone be as intellectually rich as the diverse 
group? 
We should never indulge the blithe assumption that iden-
tity determines viewpoints. But it does not follow that we 
must jump to the absolutist conclusion that identities, in plu-
ral, do not influence viewpoints. 
The debate over the diversity rationale finally condenses 
to much the same debate that permeates all divisions between 
the strict and intermediate scrutinizers-the quantity and 
quality of the proof that will be required; the closeness of the 
nexus that will be demanded between cause and effect. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FCC in Metro Broadcasting did point to a significant 
body of empirical data supporting the proposition that the 
ethnic identity of the owners of broadcast stations bore a rela-
tionship to programming content. The FCC studies, for ex-
ample, concluded that minority-owned stations presented 
programming more targeted to minority issues. 65 This data 
was enthusiastically endorsed by the majority of the Court in 
Metro Broadcasting, and roundly criticized by the dissenters. 
It isn't my purpose tore-litigate the case here, however, but to 
brush with broad strokes. 
Justice Brennan is, in the end, right to employ intermedi-
ate scrutiny to affirmative action, right to permit such plans to 
be grounded in the desire to remedy general societal discrimi-
nation, and right to permit such plans as devices for promot-
65. 110 S. Ct. at 3018 n.34. 
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ing diversity.66 
In the end, the sorry conceptual disarray of our constitu-
tional doctrines in this area forces the sacrifice of candor. The 
FCC is forced to recast its goals, Justice Brennan is forced 
into lame and unconvincing distinctions between federal and 
state programs, and in our everyday institutional lives, we are 
forced to speak in code and dress up our motives and our 
methods. It would be better, in my view, to stop these cha-
rades. American constitutional and political discourse is a 
blend of individualist and collectivist impulses. This is as true 
in the jurisprudence of the first amendment as the fourteenth. 
The two impulses live in tension, but the tension is healthy. 
In affirmative action cases, when we are dealing with minority 
groups that we all recognize have a long and poignant history 
of societal discrimination, we ought to openly let more collec-
tivist thinking into the mix, particularly when that mix will 
also enrich the marketplace of ideas. 
POSTSCRIPT: THE CLARENCE THOMAS 
NOMINATION 
Not long after I delivered this speech at the University of 
Arkansas School of Law, Justice Thurgood Marshall an-
nounced his retirement from the Supreme Court, and Presi-
dent Bush nominated Judge Clarence Thomas to be 
Marshall's replacement. The debate surrounding the Thomas 
nomination implicates many of the themes discussed in this 
article, and the editors of the Arkansas Law Review quite gra-
ciously invited me to comment on Judge Thomas, and the is-
sues of race and diversity posed by his nomination. 
At times in this article I refer to the "liberal wing" of the 
Court. In the context of Metro Broadcasting, that wing was 
comprised of the Court's three liberal stalwarts, Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun. With Justices Brennan and 
66. Like Professor Devins, I do not really believe that the FCC grounded its pro-
gram solely in the diversity rationale. I believe that to a large degree the program was 
remedial, but the agency did not have proof of past institutional discrimination nomi-
nally required to support a remedial plan. The FCC reverted to diversity, partly out of 
a genuine desire to achieve that diversity and partly out of a desire to remedy an imbal-
ance in the broadcast spectrum caused by prior societal discrimination. See Devins, 
supra note 25. · 
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Marshall now departed from the Court, it seems unlikely that 
the precedent of Metro Broadcasting will be long-lived. But 
more significantly, the very term "liberal wing" is now obso-
lete. If there is still a liberal wing, it is flying on one engine. 
In reflecting on the Thomas nomination, I take certain 
truths to be self-evident: that Clarence Thomas is a black con-
servative, that he was nominated to the Court by President 
Bush because he is a black conservative, and that some of the 
organized opposition to his nomination was the result of his 
being a black conservative. (I say some of his opposition was 
the result of his being a black conservative. I believe most of 
the opposition to Thomas was the result of his being conserva-
tive, period-without regard to his race.) 
The philosophical questions posed are whether it was le-
gitimate for President Bush to nominate Thomas because he 
was either black or conservative or both, and conversely, 
whether it was legitimate to oppose him for those reasons. I 
defend President Bush's prerogative to nominate a black con-
servative. I wish, however, that the President had been more 
candid about his motivations. 
We can analyze the President's choice by first breaking it 
down to its component parts. Is it legitimate for the President 
to nominate a conservative? The consensus answer is surely 
yes. 
The argument is made, of course, that Presidents should 
appoint "distinguished" lawyers to the Supreme Court on the 
basis of antiseptic and neutral "professional qualifications." 
Since this is so wildly out of touch with what President's do in 
fact, this argument is seldom pressed in its pure form. In 
healthy deference to reality, nearly everyone concedes that 
Presidents may take ideology into account. One usually 
hears, however, the platitude that a nominee should be ap-
proved by a Senator, even when the Senator disagrees with the 
nominee's ideological positions, as long as the nominee is 
"within the mainstream." But this tradition is itself more a 
matter of convenience and politics than principle. The width 
of the "mainstream" increases and decreases with the impor-
tance of the nomination and the caprices of politics. This tug 
and pull is itself within the mainstream of the constitutional 
tradition-there is nothing unnatural or wrong with the con-
966 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:935 
firmation testimony of some nominees lasting two weeks, and 
others (like the testimony of Lewis Powell) lasting two hours. 
A President is thus well within the constitutional tradi-
tion in seeking to place persons on the Court with whom he or 
she is in ideological harmony. The President is checked only 
by the political will of the Senate. There is no question of 
moral or constitutional legitimacy here, only raw politics: the 
President is entitled to appoint persons as conservative or lib-
eral as he or she can get away with, given the political mood 
of the moment. 
Is it legitimate for a President to use race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, or sex in choosing a nominee? Here, serious students of 
the Constitution differ. There will be colorblind and sex-blind 
individualists who will insist that the only valid criteria are 
"professional qualifications," which may include, presumably, 
harmony with the President's ideological views, but never 
such matters as race or sex. Thus it is said that there should 
not be a "black seat" or "Jewish seat" or "woman's seat" on 
the Court. President Bush paid half-hearted and unconvinc-
ing lip-service to this colorblind view in insisting repeatedly 
that he was merely looking for the "best qualified" person to 
fill Thurgood Marshall's vacancy. 
As explained in this article, I would not have been so shy 
as the President in openly admitting that Clarence Thomas' 
race was a dominate factor in his selection. Racial, ethnic, 
sexual, and religious diversity on the Court is, in my view, 
vital to the constitutional process in modem times. While I 
would never make specific racial or sexual identity a require-
ment in filling vacancies, and would never be so crass and 
mechanical as to insist on the maintenance of a "black seat," I 
think that treating the pursuit of diversity as a significant 
"plus factor" in shaping the aggregate make-up of the Court 
is not only permissible, but necessary. I will put the matter 
bluntly and personally: the Supreme Court and the nation 
have benefited enormously from the service of Justice 
Thurgood Marshall and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in 
both substance and symbol, not merely because they are tal-
ented lawyers and leaders, but because their race and sex 
brought experiences and insights to the Court that enriched 
and improved its decision-making. 
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If President Bush was acting legitimately in nominating a 
conservative, and in nominating a black, did the nomination 
somehow forfeit its legitimacy because Thomas was both con-
servative and black? I should say at the outset here that many 
liberal Senators and public interest groups who opposed 
Thomas opposed him only because he was conservative. (I am 
a liberal myself, and not enthusiastic about Thomas' conserva-
tism.) Many of these same Senators and groups also opposed 
Robert Bork, and in some instances David Souter, on the 
same ideological grounds. That opposition, in my view, was 
perfectly legitimate-every bit as legitimate as the President's 
invocation of ideology in selecting the candidate in the first 
place. This is, again, simply a matter of political struggle: the 
President is entitled to push as hard in one direction as he or 
she can, and political opponents are entitled to push back as 
hard as they can, with each side left to its own devices in cal-
culating the net long term political pluses and minuses. 
But what of those who opposed Thomas but did not op-
pose Souter, because they felt that if the nominee is to be 
black, he or she must be a liberal black, a Thurgood Marshall 
black, a pro-affirmative action black? Here, in my view, the 
legitimacy of the opposition to Thomas fails. To oppose 
Thomas because he is both black and conservative is wrong. 
To say to Thomas that because he is black he cannot be con-
servative, or is somehow not "black enough" to count, is 
unjust. 
Now it may be objected that requiring a black nominee to 
represent the "black viewpoint" as defined by the civil rights 
"establishment" is merely to carry the quest for ideological 
diversity to its logical conclusion. If it is permissible to seek 
out a black person for the Supreme Court in order to promote 
diversity among the viewpoints on the Court (as I think it is), 
then it seems only sensible to insist that the particular black 
nominee represent the viewpoints that will in fact bring diver-
sity to the Court. Some who have opposed Thomas because 
he is a black conservative have put it precisely that way: the 
President, as far as they are concerned, should have simply 
appointed another white Anthony Kennedy or David Souter, 
and spared the nation the tokenism of Thomas. 
This argument is misguided and unfair-it says too little 
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about what diversity really means, and indulges too much in 
the blithe assumption that in examining any particular indi-
vidual, it is permissible to assume or require that race be a 
surrogate for intellectual identity. The argument that Clar-
ence Thomas will bring no more diversity to the Court than, 
say, Justice David Souter, simply fails to measure up to the 
lessons of experience. It takes many years for the "jurispru-
dential personality" of a Supreme Court Justice to mature, 
and it is impossible to judge today what the long-term contri-
butions of David Souter or Clarence Thomas will be. They 
may both emerge, over time, as magnificent Justices. They 
may both come to surprise George Bush. And they may 
prove to be very much alike or very different in their voting 
patterns. But common sense and our national experience in-
struct us that their different racial identity and upbringing 
cannot help but contribute to the understandings and perspec-
tives that comprise the Court's deliberative process. To say 
that Clarence Thomas' conservatism snuffs out his childhood 
poverty, his experiences with prejudice, his blackness, is tore-
duce the inscrutable mysteries of human personality and intel-
lect to sterile political mathematics. 
Most fundamentally, however, to disqualify Clarence 
Thomas as a Supreme Court Justice because he is a black con-
servative is utterly incompatible with either the constitutional 
traditions of free speech or equality. For effectively, this says 
to Clarence Thomas, "Because you were born black, you 
should not aspire to the Supreme Court of the United States 
unless you agree to embrace moderate-to-liberal ideological 
positions." 
There is nothing wrong with basing opposition to 
Thomas on his conservative views, as long as one would have 
been equally opposed to him if he were white, and on balance 
I suspect that most of the opposition to Thomas has been 
race-neutral. This is the stuff of politics, and not "law as 
courts know law," to borrow a phase from Justice Potter 
Stewart, 67 and over time can be expected to ebb and flow with 
the political currents. But there is something deeply wrong 
67. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (1971). 
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with giving white conservatives a pass and black conservatives 
a shake-down. I hope there has really not been much of that; 
it certainly should not be condoned. 

